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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Frank Donald Marks appeals from the judgment of conviction for three counts of
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen entered following a jury trial. On appeal, he
asserts that the district court erred, and violated his constitutional rights to due process,
to present witnesses, and to present a defense, under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, when it prevented his medical expert from testifying at trial. He further
asserts that the district court erred when it permitted Rule 404(b) evidence to be
admitted over his objection.

Finally, he asserts that the district court abused its

discretion when it imposed concurrent, unified life sentences, with thirty years fixed, on
the three charges, especially in light of his having passed two polygraphs concerning
the charges, and when it denied his Rule 35 motion, which was supported by new
information, most notably the fact that the victims felt that the sentences were too harsh.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Frank Donald Marks was charged by Information with three counts of lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen. Each charge alleged a different victim, with count
one pertaining to conduct occurring between 2002 and 2006 against B.M., count two
pertaining to conduct occurring between 2002 and 200B against K.M., and count three
pertaining to conduct occurring between 2002 and May 2009 against C.O.M.1

(R.,

pp.BO-B1.) The first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict
on any of the counts. (Tr., p.497, L.14 - p.49B, L.13.)

1 B.M. and K.M. are Mr. Marks' biological daughters. (Tr., p.792, Ls.2-3; p.886, Ls.1114.) C.O.M. described Mr. Marks as her former stepfather. (Tr., p.1025, Ls.15-23.)
1

At the retrial, Mr. Marks was prevented by the district court from calling an expert
physician to testify concerning signs of sexual abuse that the expert expected to see but
were not present in medical examinations conducted on at least two of the alleged
victims following disclosure of the alleged abuse.

The district court's exclusion of

Mr. Marks' proffered expert was based, inter alia, on its consideration of the nature of
the medical records relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion. Additionally, Rule
404(b) evidence, the testimony of another of Mr. Marks' daughters concerning
uncharged alleged sexual abuse, was admitted over his objection.
The jury found Mr. Marks guilty on all three counts. (Tr., p.1303, L.5 - p.1304,
L.16.) At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a unified sentence of life, with
thirty years fixed.

(Tr., p.1332, L.16 - p.1333, LA.)

Defense counsel declined to

recommend an underlying prison sentence, but asked for probation, or, in the
alternative, a period of retained jurisdiction.

(Tr., p.1336, L.25 -

p.1337, L.11.)

Ultimately, the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with thirty
years fixed, on each count. (Tr., p.1354, Ls.6-9.)
Mr. Marks filed a timely Rule 35 motion.

(R., p.668.)

He then filed a timely

Notice of Appeal. (R., p.670.) After a hearing at which new information was presented
in support of his Rule 35 motion (Tr., p.1361, L.7 - p.1368, L.3.), the district court
denied the motion. (Tr., p.1376, Ls.22-24.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Marks' constitutional rights to due
process, to present witnesses, and to present a defense, under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, when it prevented his medical expert from testifying at
trial?

2.

Did the district court err when it permitted the presentation of 404(b) evidence?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed concurrent, unified life
sentences, with thirty years fixed, following Mr. Marks' convictions on three
counts of lewd conduct, especially in light of his having passed two polygraphs
concerning the charges?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of the new information
provided, most notably the fact that the victims felt the sentences were too harsh,
it denied Mr. Marks' Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Marks' Constitutional Rights To Due Process,
To Present Witnesses, And To Present A Defense, Under The Sixth And Fourteenth
Amendments, When It Prevented His Medical Expert From Testifying At Trial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Marks asserts that the district court erred, and violated his constitutional

rights to due process, to present witnesses, and to present a defense, under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments when it prevented his medical expert from testifying at
trial. As such, he respectfully requests that the judgment of conviction be vacated, with
this matter remanded to the district court for a new trial at which his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights are honored and his eminently-qualified expert is allowed
to testify.

B.

The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Marks' Constitutional Rights To Due
Process, To Present Witnesses, And To Present A Defense, Under The Sixth
And Fourteenth Amendments, When It Prevented His Medical Expert From
Testifying At Trial
During the first trial, it emerged that at least two of the alleged victims were

evaluated by a physician at the behest of the Department of Health and Welfare after
the allegations were made against Mr. Marks. (Tr., p.508, L.13 - p.511, L.21.) Prior to
the second trial, medical records related to these examinations were turned over to the
district court for inspection. (Tr., p.524, Ls.1-7.) The State described the evaluations as
"well child checks," a characterization disputed by defense counsel, who noted, "This is
not a well child check. Specifically, in the records they stated for the purpose of sexual
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abuse.

That was the purpose of the examination.,,2

(Tr., p.529, L.25 - p.530, L.3.)

Defense counsel then sought, and received, permission to disclose the medical records
to a physician expert for use in forming an opinion. (Tr., p.526, L.3 - p.532, L.24.)
The physician was Dr. Stephen R. Guertin, M.D., Director of Pediatric Intensive
Care at Sparrow Hospital in Lansing, Michigan, Associate Professor of Pediatrics and
Child Development at Michigan State University College of Human Medicine, and a
Board Certified Diplomate of the American Board of Pediatrics.

In his employment,

Dr. Guertin is "responsible for teaching child abuse diagnosis and treatment to rotating
medical students, residents from the Pediatric training program and residents from the
Emergency Medicine training program and residents from the Family Practice training
program." He also helps train SANE nurses and is "consulted by nurses from the SANE
program for difficult cases which present to the Emergency Department." (R., pp.31323.)
Upon learning of Mr. Marks' intent to call Dr. Guertin as an expert witness, the
State filed a Motion to Exclude Witness, seeking to prevent Dr. Guertin from testifying at
trial. (R., p.333.) In a brief in support of the Motion, the State raised several arguments,
and relied on an attached letter to a defense investigator (R., pp.341-48), as the offer of
proof as to what it anticipated would be Dr. Guertin's testimony at trial. As relevant to
this appeal, the State argued that Dr. Guertin was not qualified to render a medical

2 The records for the evaluation of B.M. indicate that she was "[h]ere for evaluation for
abuse by her father. Since the age of 8 had her father putting his penis in her anus.
Denies vaginal penetration. Abuse stopped at age 12 years old." The evaluation
included examination of 8.M.'s genitalia and rectum. (Report of Dr. 8eth Martin
concerning 8.M. (augmentation), pp.1-2.) The records for K.M. indicate that the
purpose of her visit was for "[c]onsultation: sexual abuse evaluation," and included an
examination of her external genitalia. (Report of Dr. 8eth Martin concerning K.M.
(augmentation), pp.1-2.)
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opinion concerning abuse because "his long-range diagnosis [is] based on facts he
hasn't seen (and is obviously willing to speculate about) [and, therefore,] should be
excluded." (R., pp.339-40.)
A hearing was held on the State's motion at which defense counsel argued,
"Mr. Marks has both a confrontation right and due process right under both the state
and federal constitutions to a fair trial and to confront evidence against him and to also
have evidence that is not against him presented."

(Tr., p.583, Ls.6-10.)

Defense

counsel later added, "Mr. Marks has a right to present a defense." (Tr., p.584, L.25 p.585, L.1.) The district court indicated that, with respect to Dr. Guertin's proposed
testimony concerning "whether the girls were or were not sexually abused or were or
were not being truthful whether the alleged victims were being truthful, I think that's
going to be excluded as the province of the jury." (Tr., p.587, Ls.1-5.) However, the
district court declined to make its final ruling at that point, instead allowing defense
counsel and the State an opportunity to brief the issues. (Tr., p.587, L.8 - p.588, L.13.)
In defense counsel's brief on the issue, she opened by reiterating Mr. Marks'
constitutional rights to due process, to present relevant testimony from defense
witnesses, and to confront the witnesses against him. (R., p.360.) Defense counsel
"urg[ed] the Court to allow the testimony of Dr. Guertin as well as allowing full and fair
cross-examinationeJ of the state's witnesses" by questioning them concerning the
medical records. 4

At least one witness was cross-examined concerning statements made during the
medical examinations. (Tr., p.919, LS.10-18 (K.M.).) Furthermore, the district court
never prohibited cross-examination of the witnesses on such matters. (R., pp.392-93.)
As such, this issue is not being pursued on appeal.
4 Defense counsel noted that the medical records were "not attached but the records
exist in the Court's file under seaL" (R., p.360.)
3
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Defense counsel then noted that Dr. Guertin was "well qualified" as an expert
witness under Rule 702. (R., pp.361-62.) The brief continued, "An expert's testimony is
allowed if it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or assist in
determining a fact in issue." (R., p.362.) Relying on State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688
(1988), defense counsel noted that the Idaho Supreme Court had held that under Rule
702,
an expert can render an opinion that a child has been sexually abused if
he is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience training, or education" and
that "once a proper foundation had been laid, it was not error for these
experts to render their opinions that [the child] had been abused.
That is because "[w]hether a child has been sexually abused is 'beyond common
experience' and allowing an expert to testify on this issue will 'assist' the trier of fact."
(R., pp.362-63 (quoting Hester, 114 Idaho at 692-93).)
Defense counsel then explained, "Dr. Guertin examined medical records of a
forensic exam conducted on the alleged victim. He reviewed statements by the alleged
victims. Both are things he commonly reviews and relies upon in forming an opinion."
(R., p.363.)

Continuing, defense counsel argued, "having an expert testify about the

lack of physical evidence is relevant for the jurors to hear. That is the only piece of
evidence available to the jurors that is not interested in the outcome." (R., pp.363-64.)
Asserting that the testimony and evidence were relevant to Mr. Marks'
constitutional right to present a defense, defense counsel argued that, considering the
difficulties in "[t]rying to rebuild several years of time [spanning the multi-year allegations
contained in the Information], and who was present in his home during that large time
span is extremely difficult," Dr. Guertin's testimony was "extremely important," "critical,"
exculpatory information. (R., pp.364-65.) Defense counsel further argued that, to the
extent that any of Idaho's Rules of Evidence prohibited use of the medical records, such
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rules were trumped by Mr. Marks' due process right to present a defense, as recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). (R.,
pp.365-66.)
Another hearing was held on the matter, following which the district court issued
an order. With respect to potential testimony concerning the credibility of the alleged
victims, the district court noted that such testimony would invade the province of the jury
and was not allowed. 5

(Tr., p.598, Ls.21-25.)

With respect to the remainder of

Dr. Guertin's proposed testimony, the district court explained,
The Court has looked at the factual basis of the opinion. What we have is
a physician from across the country looking at a report and assuming, first
of all, there must have been a visual exam which would have established
whether there was a hymen intact or not and speculating on what the
standard of care in Idaho is in doing an examination in this setting.[6] The
problem is this was referral by health and welfare which arose out of a
child protection action. It was not a forensic interview per se.
The only other basis of opinion that the doctor has is his perceptions of the
testimony from the transcripts and any anecdotal information given by way
of history in connection with the medical record. Clearly the physician who
performed the exam might be an appropriate expert witness in the case.
She would have at least seen the girls. This physician has not.
Based upon the status of the record, the Court finds, first of all, Dr. Guertin
lacks the kind of a factual foundation upon which experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely, and, secondly, I find that based upon the
sketchy nature of the information, the results in the medical records, that
the risk of prejudice is exceeded by the probative value. There is little, if
any, probative value based upon the factual basis of Dr. Guertin's
opinions. Accordingly, the Court is going to exclude his testimony from
trial.

5 Mr. Marks does not assign error to the district court's legal holding on this point as it
was correct, and Mr. Marks later abandoned this argument. (Tr., p.638, Ls.5-11.)
6 The district court had previously prohibited the defense, including Dr. Guertin, from
contacting the doctor who performed the examinations. (Tr., p.602, Ls.3-16.) As such,
the district court itself made it impossible to meet the district court's demands for
admissibility. Later, the district court granted permission for defense counsel and her
investigator to contact Dr. Martin, but continued its order prohibiting Dr. Guertin from
communicating with Dr. Martin. (R., p.393.)
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(Tr., p.600, L.7 - p.601, L.8.)
In its written order regarding the motion, the district court excluded Dr. Guertin's
testimony,
as it pertains to his analysis of the examination performed by Dr. Martin,
based upon the written medical records of the victims. This testimony is
inadmissible as Dr. Guertin's conclusions are speculative, and the
probative value of this testimony would be substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice and confusion under I.R.E. 403.
(R., pp.392-93.)

Finally, with respect to Dr. Guertin's proffered testimony "about

standards for forensic sexual abuse examinations and medical observations which are
typically present in victims of sexual abuse," the district court denied it explaining, "the
Court finds that this testimony is speculative, and the risk of unfair prejudice and jury
confusion substantially outweigh the testimony's probative value under I.R.E. 403.
Additionally, this testimony would not assist the trier of fact, under I.R.E. 702."

(R.,

p.393.)
Defense counsel then filed a Motion to Reconsider Exclusion of Defense Expert.
(R., p.472), supported by an affidavit from Dr. Guertin. (R., pp.474-76.) In the affidavit,
Dr. Guertin noted, "As a medical practitioner, I know how to read and interpret the
reports and data from other physicians and colleagues, and do on a regular basis to
obtain background knowledge of medical conditions." (R., p.475.) He further explained,
The residency of a medical practitioner does not determine the protocol
and practice used when investigating an allegation of sexual abuse or
penetration. There are nationally accepted protocols, exams, testing
methods and standards and those norms are the same whether practiced
in Michigan, Idaho, or any other state in the United States.
(R., pp.475-76.) He concluded, "I have testified as an expert in the state of Idaho and in
approximately 20 to 25 additional states in the United States, as well as a couple of
times in Canada." (R., p.476.)
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At a hearing on the Motion to Reconsider Exclusion of Defense Expert, defense
counsel noted that it was no longer seeking to admit Dr. Guertin's testimony concerning
credibility, but did want him to be allowed to testify as to "the standard accepted practice
of exams for sexual assault allegations and the records he reviewed in this particular
case."

(Tr., p.638, Ls.5-11.)

When asked what opinion he was expected to offer,

defense counsel explained,
I expect him to offer the opinion that the record he reviewed with regard to
[K.M.] did not show that she had a hymen, and I am not going to have the
right medical word - that was broken. Basically, I don't have the term. I
would expect him to discuss a standard practice when there is allegation
of a sexual assault of the kind of exam that is done of this.
(Tr., p.638, Ls.14-20.)
The district court ultimately concluded that Dr. Guertin had "clearly established ..
. that he is a medical expert who would be qualified, based upon a proper examination
and interview history and physical with a patient, to offer opinions with regard to whether
sexual abuse had occurred or not." (Tr., p.645, LS.6-12 (emphasis added).) Noting that
its conclusion regarding his expertise "isn't the end of the argument or the analysis," the
district court cited State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852 (Ct. App. 1991), explaining,
The analysis is lengthy in the Johnson case, but, for instance, it indicates
by citing another case with approval a doctor is not qualified to offer
opinions with regard to such abuse, if the doctor's opinion is based upon a
single visit between the doctor and the victim. We have no visit here.
An oral history by the doctor elicited from the victim. We have some
limited oral history from the medical records of Dr. Martin.
A physical finding of the absence of a hymen. That existed at least as to
one of the children.
And that the victim became upset and frightened with the doctor when the
pelvic exam was started.
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That physician was not allowed to offer an opinion because he didn't have
a proper factual basis with regard to what had occurred. And that's the
thrust of the Court's decision.
To allow this physician to offer an opinion with regard to whether sexual
abuse occurred as alleged or not requires that the Court and Dr. Guertin
assume Dr. Martin performed a forensic examination based upon
allegations of sexual abuse. The medical records themselves do not
speak to that. It indicates they were based on a request for a well child
check, or welfare check. And, in essence, Dr. Guertin would be testifying
as to what Dr. Martin had to have seen under the circumstances. And the
Court finds that to be too speculative. The prejudicial value exceeds the
risk of any probability of the likelihood of the evidence under 403, as the
Court previously concluded. It tends to shift the focus of the case and try
to have the doctor in essence offer testimony that Dr. Martin would have
seen different things if this abuse had occurred as consistent with the
child's - the children's testimony.
The motion to reconsider is denied.
(Tr., p.645, L.i5 - p.647, L.5.)
The district court's reliance on Johnson was misplaced. The issue in Johnson
concerned whether the State's purported expert, Dr. Little, was qualified to render an
opinion as to whether the victims had been sexually abused based on both his training
and experience as well as the information he relied upon in forming his opinion.
Johnson, 119 Idaho at 857.

After discussing two cases from other jurisdictions, the

Court of Appeals concluded,
Here, Dr. Little should not have been allowed to offer his opinion that the
children had been sexually molested. He had little if any experience with
child sexual abuse.CJ The only information available to support his
The Court of Appeals summarized Dr. Little's qualifications as follows,
On direct examination, Dr. Little testified that he was a licensed general
practitioner ... had been a physician for five years and employed by his
current employer for three years. The doctor said that he did not
specialize as a physician and had no specific training in the area of child
sexual abuse. He stated that he was not a member of any professional
organization and had not published any articles. He pointed out that he
had seen "maybe half a dozen or so" children he thought had been
molested.
Id. at 855-56.
7
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opinion was gleaned from one visit with the children in which he found no
physical evidence of molestation.
He relied solely on the histories
provided by the children and the mother that the children had been
molested. The basis for the doctor's opinion is limited even more by the
fact that the mother, who supplied some of the information the doctor
relied on in forming his opinion, could only tell him what the children had
told her.
Essentially, Dr. Little's opinion was a judgment on the children's credibility,
that is, he believed they were telling the truth.
Id.
The situation presented in Mr. Marks' case is significantly different from Johnson.
Here, unlike the physician in Johnson, Dr. Guertin was clearly an expert qualified to
form an opinion regarding child sexual abuse. With respect to the second issue, the
type of information available to Dr. Guertin in forming his opinion concerning whether
the physical evidence indicated that sexual abuse occurred, the district court was told
that he had reviewed the medical records, along with the discovery in this case, and
concluded that there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse found during the
examinations.

He also would have testified as to the type of examination that would

have been conducted, under national standards for such examinations, and that he
frequently reviews medical records created by other physicians in reaching an opinion.
Appellate counsel is unaware of any cases in which a proffered expert's failure to
examine the person about whom an opinion is to be rendered precludes admission of
opinion testimony. To the contrary, a number of Idaho Supreme Court cases imply that
the use of an expert who has not actually examined the person about whom the expert
is rendering an opinion is common and accepted. See Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho
334, 336 (1988) (quoting from an affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for
summary judgment in medical malpractice case in which plaintiff had died in which the
plaintiff's expert noted, "That I have reviewed the medical care and treatment rendered
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by [defendants] to [plaintiff] ... [and] it is the opinion of your Affiant, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, that [defendants] did not comply with the applicable
standard of practice ... ,,8); Clarke v. Prenger, 114 Idaho 766, 767 (1988) (same 9);
Dunlap by and through Dunlap v. Garner, 127 Idaho 599,601 (same 10 ).
Unlike the non-expert physician in Johnson, Dr. Guertin had the information that
he, as an expert, needed to form an opinion in this matter.

For the district court to

conclude otherwise, based on its incorrect reading of Johnson, was erroneous and
amounted to an abuse of discretion. The district court instead put itself in the position of
an expert, deciding for itself the significance of the medical records reviewed by the
expert, in concluding that Dr. Guerlin should not be allowed to testify. While the fact
that Dr. Guerlin had never physically examined the alleged victims may have been
relevant to the weight a jury might give his testimony, it certainly didn't, as a matter of
law, preclude its admissibility.

See State v. Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679, 681 (Ct. App.

1987) (finding it improper for trial court to exclude proffered expert on breath testing
machines because of his lack of experience with the particular type of machine used,
explaining "[t]he lack of direct experience is not fatal to [his] qualifications but it may
affect the weight given his testimony"). The plain language of Idaho Rule of Evidence
703, in relevant part, provides, "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an

The fact that the plaintiff's expert had not examined the plaintiff does not appear to
have been raised as a reason to exclude the expert's opinion. This makes sense, as
the plaintiff had died within days of the claimed malpractice.
9 The defendant does not appear to have challenged the reliance on an expert who had
not personally examined the plaintiff; the issues on appeal were whether the plaintiff's
expert was sufficiently familiar with the local standard of care and whether he could offer
an expert opinion in light of the fact that he was not of the same medical specialty as the
defendant. However, the fact that the defendant did not challenge reliance on such an
opinion on the basis of the expert having failed to examine the plaintiff is instructive as
to how such opinions are viewed under Idaho law.
8
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expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing." I.R.E. 703 (emphasis added).

Nothing in the plain

language of Rule 703 requires that the expert personally gather the information relied
upon, let alone conduct a physical examination of the source of that information. By
applying incorrect legal standards to this issue, the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow Dr. Guertin to testify.
1.

No Valid, Alternative Basis Exists For The District Court's Holding

Because the district court's original, pre-reconsideration decision appears to
have been based on a number of alternative grounds, Mr. Marks will explain why they,
too, were erroneous and represent an abuse of discretion.
With respect to the district court's conclusion, following the original hearing, that
Dr. Guertin's proffered testimony was "speculative," Mr. Marks notes that the Idaho
Supreme Court has explained, "Testimony is speculative when it 'theoriz[es] about a
matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge.'"

Coombs v.

Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140 (2009) (brackets in original) (quoting Karlson v. Harris, 140
Idaho 561, 565 (2004)). In Dr. Guertin's letter, characterized by the State as the offer of
proof as to his testimony, he noted,
[K.M.]'s normal physical examination is very important.
Certainly,
penile/vaginal intercourse, if it had begun when she was somewhere
between 6 and 8 years of age, would have been expected to have caused
significant injury and discovery in a child that young. Typical injury in a
child that young would have included a complete transection of the
hymen.
In other words, the expected
Transections of the hymen persist.
transection would have or should have still been there. Although [K.M.]
did not have a speculum examination, the external genitalia were
The defendant in this case does not appear to have challenged the expert's opinion
on the basis that he failed to conduct a personal examination of the plaintiff.
10
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examined which would have included an examination of the hymen. A
transection would have been expected given her allegations. This is
especially true given the allegation of penile/vaginal contact occurring as
often as every other day. It wasn't there.
It is also notable that a speculum examination of [K.M.] could not be done.
In a child who had recurrent episodes of penile/vaginal intercourse,
extending up through age 13 years or so, it would be expected that a
speculum could be admitted without discomfort.
(Letter from Dr. Guertin, dated December 5, 2010, p.7 (contained in electronic file of
confidential exhibits).) The proffered testimony of Dr. Guertin excerpted above consists
of anything but theorizing and instead involves the application of medical knowledge to
the facts to reach a well-reasoned conclusion.

Concluding that such testimony was

"speculative" was erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
With respect to the district court's conclusion, following the original hearing, that
the proffered testimony would not have assisted the trier of fact, Mr. Marks submits that
his proffered expert testimony that medical evidence called into question whether the
victim had been abused would certainly have "assist[ed] the trier of fact ... to determine
a fact in issue .... " I.R.E. 702. This principle was clearly established by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Hester in which the Court held, "Whether a child has been sexually
abused is 'beyond common experience' and allowing an expert to testify on this issue
will 'assist' the trier of fact . . . [and] [u]nder I.R.E. 702, such expert testimony is
allowable .... " Hester, 114 Idaho 688 (footnote omitted) (citing Stoddard v. Nelson, 99
Idaho 293 (1978)).

In light of clear case law on the subject, the district court's

conclusion that such evidence would not assist the trier of fact was erroneous and
represented an abuse of discretion.
The final basis upon which the district court explained it would exclude
Dr. Guertin's proffered testimony was its conclusion that, under Idaho Rule of Evidence
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403, the testimony's relevance was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and
confusion of the issues.
With respect to the confusion of the issues holding, Mr. Marks asserts that the
testimony was central to the only issue in the case; namely, whether Mr. Marks sexually
abused the victims. It is unclear from the district court's blanket conclusion how it would
have confused the issues when it was both clearly relevant and concerned the only
issue before the jury.
With respect to the unfair prejudice conclusion, Mr. Marks asserts that the
conclusion is wrong in light of the fact that Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 "does not offer
protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental
to the party's case. The rule protects against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is,
if it tends to suggest decision on an improper basis." State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 1981)). Nothing
about the proffered testimony of Dr. Guertin regarding his medical opinion based on a
review of the medical records and other information indicates that it would tend to
suggest decision on an improper basis. To the contrary, it was evidence that tended to
suggest that the abuse for which Mr. Marks was tried did not occur because signs that
Dr. Guertin, in his training and experience diagnosing child sexual abuse, would expect
to see in a victim of the type of abuse described were not present. That can hardly be
said to be unfairly prejudicial.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Rules of Evidence do apply to bar
Dr. Guertin's testimony, Mr. Marks maintains that they must yield to his constitutional
rights to due process, to present witnesses, and to present a defense under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
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The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in relevant part,
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In overturning a Texas rule that prohibited calling a co-defendant to testify, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to
present a defense, specifically the right to call witnesses on one's behalf, is applicable
to the states pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967). The Court recognized, in dicta, that,
under the Sixth Amendment, "it could hardly be argued that a State would not violate
the clause if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law."

Id. at 22.

In U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), the Supreme Court

explained, "In Washington, this Court found a violation of this Clause of the Sixth
Amendment when the defendant was arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony [that] would have
been relevant and material, and '"

vital to the defense.'"

Valenzuela-Bernal at 867

(quoting Washington at 16) (modification and emphases in original).
The evidence sought to be presented by Mr. Marks was relevant and material for
the reasons set forth supra, and was vital because, as defense counsel noted,
considering the difficulties in "[t]rying to rebuild several years of time [spanning the
allegations contained in the Information], and who was present in his home during that
large time span is extremely difficult," Dr. Guertin's testimony was "extremely important,"
"critical," exculpatory information. (R., pp.364-65.)
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Mr. Marks asserts that, even assuming that the Rules of Evidence somehow bar
the presentation of Dr. Guertin's testimony, any such rule or rules may not be applied to
exclude the proffered testimony under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, because Dr. Guertin's
testimony was "relevant," "material," and "vital" to the defense.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Marks respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a retrial at which
Mr. Marks' constitutional rights are respected and his eminently-qualified expert witness
is permitted to testify.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Presentation Of 404(b) Evidence

A.

Introduction
Mr. Marks asserts that the district court erred when, over his objection, it

permitted Rule 404(b) evidence concerning prior acts with another of his daughters
without engaging in the analysis and review required under applicable legal standards.
Furthermore, even assuming such compliance, the prior acts were irrelevant propensity
evidence inadmissible under Rule 404.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a district court's determination to admit prior acts evidence

under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), the appellate courts review the relevancy
determination de novo. See State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 824 (Ct. App. 2009).
Review of the district court's balancing of the probative versus prejudicial value of the
evidence is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).
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When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a three part inquiry to determine whether that discretion was abused. First,
the district court must have perceived the issue as one of discretion.

Second, the

district court must have acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any applicable legal standards.
reached its decision in an exercise of reason.

Third, the district court must have

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600

(1989).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Presentation Of 404(b)
Evidence
Prior to the retrial in this case, the State provided notice of its intent to offer

404(b) evidence to which defense counsel objected.

(R., p.470.)

That evidence

consisted of testimony of another of Mr. Marks' daughters, B.K.M.,11 in which she was
expected to describe sexual abuse by her father, which was summarized by the State
as follows:
Quite simply stated, your Honor, we have a witness coming forward with
uncharged criminal conduct related to the instant offence [sic] who will
state that the sexual allegations of sexual abuse occurred in the same
area, same situations, location to include television, bed, time of day,
things of that nature. It is also the similar age range, your Honor, between
nine and 13 years of age. It is also the same sexual misconduct in that
she will discuss penetration of both anal and vaginal openings. Also the
same methodology of molestation in that there would be bribes, coercion,
promises of gifts and things of that nature.
(Tr., p.650, L.25 - p.651, L.11.)
Defense counsel argued, "I think using the testimony of [B.K.M.] is propensity
evidence. I don't think it meets the 404(b) accepted values. If it did, the Court still has
to balance whether it is more probative than prejudicial, and it is far more prejudicial in

11

A middle initial is being used to distinguish this witness from alleged victim B.M.
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this case."

(Tr., p.652, Ls.1-5.)

She then questioned the validity of the testimony,

arguing, "the allegations that [B.K.M.] now makes and did not at first, the Court is well
aware that she was questioned and said nothing happened to her. It took a year. And I
think we were at a hung jury when she decided something did happen to her and then
talked to law enforcement." (Tr., p.652, LS.15-20 (emphasis added).)
In allowing the evidence over Mr. Marks' objection after a brief hearing at which
the witness was not presented, the district court made the following pronouncement:
The Court has considered the argument. I am more familiar with this file
than most, since we did have a previous trial. I have considered 404(b). I
have considered the prejudicial nature of the potential evidence. I have
considered Rule 403 and the weight of the probative value versus the
prejudicial. I am aware that there would be a limiting instruction, if such
testimony was allowed.
The Court finds that the evidence clearly falls within 404(b). It tends to
show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan. It
is prejudicial. If it wasn't prejudicial the state probably wouldn't offer it.
But the prejudice is not substantially outweighed by the probative value.
Accordingly, the motion to allow 404(b) evidence is allowed.
(Tr., p.654, Ls.11-25.)
In State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the
applicability of Idaho Rule of Evidence 404 to uncharged allegations of child sexual
abuse. After clarifying that such evidence is subject to the same standards as any other
prior act evidence, the Court explained,
Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for
a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis. First, the trial court
must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other
crime or wrong as fact. The trial court must also determine whether the
fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant.
Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Such
evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor.

20

Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under !.R.E. 403 and
determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
the probative value of the evidence. This balancing is committed to the
discretion of the trial judge. The trial court must determine each of these
considerations of admissibility on a case-by-case basis.
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court found error in

the district court's failure to "determine whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish as fact Grist's prior uncharged sexual misconduct," and in failing to "articulate
whether the evidence was probative because it demonstrated the existence of a
common scheme or plan or because it tended to otherwise corroborate [the victim's]
testimony."

Id. at 53.

With respect to the latter issue, the Court noted that 404(b)

evidence "may be admissible 'if relevant to prove . . . a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of
one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." Id. at 54-55 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742
(1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)). The Court

concluded, "We once again caution the trial courts of this state that they must carefully
examine evidence offered for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a common
scheme or plan in order to determine whether the requisite relationship exists." Id. at
55.
In Mr. Marks' case, the district court skipped the first step of the analysis when it
failed to make a finding as to whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the fact
of the other crime. 12 In doing so, it abused its discretion because it failed to consider

The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that compliance with this requirement is not
necessary unless the question of whether the prior conduct occurred is before the
district court. See State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 151 (Ct. App. 2011) (Finding no
error in failing to make finding where "Gomez did not argue that the other crimes,
wrongs, or acts did not occur; rather, he argued that they were not relevant to any issue
12
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the applicable legal standards. The district court further erred when it failed to conduct
the type of careful examination mandated by the Idaho Supreme Court with respect to
whether the testimony of Mr. Marks' other daughter met the requirements of
admissibility for prior acts evidence.

Rather, the district court's reasoning was

conclusory, consisting of little more than the following: "The Court finds that the
evidence clearly falls within 404(b)" because "[ilt tends to show motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, common scheme or plan."

(Tr., p.654, Ls.19-22.)

The district

court's failure to provide any sort of analysis for why or how the prior act evidence was
admissible as common scheme or plan evidence represents an abuse of discretion
because it failed to consider the applicable legal standards.
Furthermore, the probative value of the evidence was minimal considering the
fact that the State already had the testimony of three witnesses who all reported similar
instances of abuse comprising the accusations for which Mr. Marks was on trial in this
matter. Any minimal probative value presented by B.K.M.'s testimony was substantially
outweighed by the prejudice suffered by Mr. Marks in a jury hearing of alleged bad acts
about which the jury was not asked to reach a verdict.
Mr. Marks further asserts that, even assuming the district court had followed the
requirements of Grist, the 404(b) evidence should not have been admitted because it
was irrelevant propensity evidence under Grist and State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664
(2010). In Johnson, decided shortly after Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the
restrictions on what would otherwise be propensity evidence being offered to show a
common scheme or plan.

Johnson was charged with sexually abusing his daughter

other than propensity and that the prejudice of that evidence outweighed its probative
value"). Given the fact that Mr. Marks' attorney questioned the validity of the proffered
evidence (Tr., p.652, Ls.15-20.), the district court was required to make such a finding.
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when she was between six and seven years old. In order to help establish its case, the
State was permitted, over an 404(b) objection, to offer evidence that Johnson had
sexually abused his younger sister when she was approximately eight years old and
when he was between fifteen and sixteen years old. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 666.
Interpreting Grist, the Court explained,
At a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or plan
beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in
the past. The events must be linked by common characteristics that go
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively
tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts.
Id. at 668.

The district court had found the prior act evidence to be admissible as relevant to
show a common scheme or plan based on the following similarities between the
charges at issue and the prior act evidence, "(1) both victims were about seven to eight
years old; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as an 'authority figure' because he was an
older brother or father; (3) both courses of conduct involved Johnson requesting the
victim to touch his penis." Id. at 669. In finding the admission of the testimony to be
erroneous because the prior acts were irrelevant, the Court reasoned, "These
similarities, however, are sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common
scheme or plan' in Johnson's behavior. The facts that the two victims in this case are
juvenile females and that Johnson is a family member are precisely what makes these
incidents unfortunately quite ordinary." Id.
More recently, in State v. Joy, _

Idaho _

(June 25, 2013), the Idaho Supreme

Court clarified its relevance holdings in Grist and Johnson, finding that, in order to be
relevant to establish a common scheme or plan, prior conduct evidence must be part of
a single plan to commit both the earlier (uncharged) and later (charged) offenses. To
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allow otherwise would do no more than allow the jury to find guilt based on a propensity
to commit such offenses. Joy, _ Idaho at _.
As in Johnson, evidence that Mr. Marks may have sexually abused another of his
daughters by engaging in similar conduct with her is not relevant in establishing a
common scheme or plan to abuse the three victims in this case. With respect to any
similarities supporting the common scheme or plan justification, it is worth noting that,
while two of the named victims claimed that the first instance of abuse occurred when
all three were present 13 (Tr., p.800, LS.7-13 (B.M.); p.1029, L.18 - p.1032, L.6
(C.O.M.)), B.K.M. testified that the abuse first occurred when she and Mr. Marks were
alone and never involved anyone else. (Tr., p.1001, L.2 - p.1012, L.9.)
Due to the district court's failure to conduct the first step of the analysis required
under 404(b), it was erroneous to admit the evidence. Even assuming that the district
court conducted the first step (or was not required to do so), in light of the dissimilarities
between the charged allegations of abuse and the testimony of B.K.M. regarding
alleged abuse, as well as the lack of any evidence that the alleged abuse of B.K.M. was
part of a plan to commit the abuse for which he was charged, the district court erred in
admitting B.K.M.'s testimony.

Absent the State demonstrating that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Marks is entitled to have his convictions
vacated, with this matter remanded for a new trial at which the improper, propensity
evidence is not presented.

13 The third named victim, K.M., testified that she couldn't remember the first instance of
abuse because she "kind of blocked the stuff." (Tr., p.892, L.1 0 - p.893, L.1.)
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III.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent, Unified Life
Sentences, With Thirty Years Fixed, Following Mr. Marks' Convictions For Lewd
Conduct, Especially In Light Of His Having Passed Two Polygraphs Concerning The
Charges

A.

Introduction
Mr. Marks asserts that, in light of the mitigating circumstances present in his

case, especially the fact that he passed two polygraph examinations concerning the
charges, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed concurrent, unified life
sentences, with thirty years fixed, following his convictions for lewd conduct.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent, Unified
Life Sentences, With Thirty Years Fixed, Following Mr. Marks' Convictions For
Lewd Conduct, Especially In Light Of His Having Passed Two Polygraphs
Concerning The Charges
Mr. Marks asserts that, given any view of the facts, his concurrent, unified life

sentences, with thirty years fixed, are excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Marks does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Marks must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
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excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) the protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The most important mitigating factor is that Mr. Marks has passed two polygraph
examinations, taken two years apart, in which he denied that he had sexually abused
anyone, including his daughters. (Confidential Exhibits, pp.229, 235.) In a polygraph
administered in October 2009, Douglas A. Orr, Ph.D.,14 asked Mr. Marks whether he
had "ever had intercourse with any of your daughters" and "have you ever penetrated
any of them with your penis." Mr. Marks answered both questions with a "No." Dr. Orr
concluded, "It is my opinion that Mr. Marks exhibited physiological reactions
consistent with those of a truthful person."

(Confidential Exhibits, pp.143-44

(emphasis in original).) In a full-disclosure polygraph administered by Dr. Orr in April
2011 as part of the pre-sentencing process, he asked Mr. Marks three relevant
questions: (1) "Do you have any victims of a sexual crime?"; (2) "Did you lie about
having no victims?"; and (3) "Are there any victims you have not told me about?"

14 In the second polygraph report, Dr. Orr provided the following summary of his
professional qualifications:
Consistent with the requirements of the APA's Model Policy, I have
completed a basic course of polygraph training at a polygraph school
accredited by the APA and meet other training, experience and
competency requirements for professional membership in the APA.
Furthermore, I have successfully completed 1) a minimum of forty (40)
hours of specialized post-conviction sex offender training that adheres to
the standards established by the APA; 2) a minimum of thirty (30)
continuing education hours every two (2) years. Fifteen of those hours
each year pertain to specialized sex offender polygraph training; and, 3) a
minimum number of examinations in accordance with APA standards prior
to undertaking PCSOT [the Model Policy for Post-Conviction Sex Offender
Testing] examinations unsupervised.
(Confidential Exhibits, pp.145-46.)
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Mr. Marks answered "No" to each question. Dr. Orr concluded, "It is my opinion that
Mr. Marks exhibited physiological reactions consistent with those of a truthful
person." (Confidential Exhibits, p.152 (emphasis in original).)
Perversely, our system punishes those who maintain their innocence more
harshly than those who are, and plead, guilty, especially those convicted of sex
offenses. This is even true of those who pass polygraph examinations regarding the
allegations against them. Mr. Marks was not able to take responsibility because he is
innocent, and, as such, his failure to take responsibility for something he did not do was
used against him to enhance his sentence. This is an issue the district court discussed
at sentencing, explaining, "I struggled with the concept of a relatively short fixed
sentence based on the facts that [defense counsel] recited. No criminal history to speak
of. Passed the polygraph." (Tr., p.1348, Ls.3-6.) The district court went on to say,
I toyed with the idea of a retained jurisdiction ... but to get through that
you would have to go through sex offender's [sic] treatment, and to get
through sex offenders [sic] treatment the first thing you have to do is admit
what you did, and you haven't. And I sense you won't.
(Tr., p.1348, Ls.10-18.)

Had Mr. Marks entered a false guilty plea, he would

undoubtedly have faced a much shorter sentence, and had he continued such a lie by
telling the treatment providers that he was guilty, he would have had a much better
chance at succeeding in a retained jurisdiction program or before the parole board.
Other mitigating factors present in his case deserve consideration as well. These
charges represent Mr. Marks' first convictions for any crimes - misdemeanor or felony.
(Confidential Exhibits,15 pp.175-76.) Mr. Marks' childhood was troubled, a time in his life
which he described in his PSI questionnaire as follows:

15 All references to the PSI and attachments thereto will be to the PDF file containing
the confidential exhibits in this case, which will be referred to as "Confidential Exhibits."
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I was primarily raised by my mother in Oregon. My parents got divorced
when I was very young. We did not see our dad very often. Mom worked
a lot. Some of mom's boyfriends were abusive to me & my brothers.
Then she met Walt and that stopped. We had a stable environment in
Springfield OR with Walt. When I was a teenager my mom and Walt got
into Meth. I started staying with my grandparents (dads [sic] parents).
After that my mom got divorced. After that use kids stayed in the house. I
was 16-17 years old. Walt was gone and mom took off with her boyfriend.
Rich and I took care of Mike.C 6 ] Rich and I were not going to school but
trying to work to take care of the house & Mike. After a couple of months
mom came back and we had to move. I moved into my girlfriends [sic]
house with her and her parents. We married at 18.
(Confidential Exhibits, p.176.)
Mr. Marks was gainfully employed in the decade preceding his arrest in this
matter, working as a heavy equipment and truck mechanic for a number of businesses.
He also has experience as a welder.

(Confidential Exhibits, pp.179-80.)

Finally,

Mr. Marks enjoys the support of his family and friends. He submitted letters of support
from several family members, including his mother, younger brother, Michael, and
several nieces, as well as letters from several friends. (Confidential Exhibits, pp.23946.) His mother also testified on his behalf at the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.1325, L.24
- p.1329, L.2.)
In light of his age, Mr. Marks essentially received a fixed life sentence. He was
nearly forty years old when he was arrested, and will be nearly seventy years old when
he is first eligible for parole.

In light of the system's discomfort with persons who

maintain their innocence, especially those convicted of sex offenses, Mr. Marks is highly
unlikely to get paroled at that time unless he is willing, in the interim, to admit to
something he didn't do. Regardless, even if he does admit to conduct which he has
consistently denied and for which he passed two polygraph examinations, he will not be

16 Rich and Mike are, respectively, Mr. Marks' older and younger brothers. (Confidential
Exhibits, p.176.)
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eligible for parole until 2039. Mr. Marks submits that, especially for a first offender, such
a sentence is unreasonable.

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When, In Light Of The New Information
Provided In Support Thereof, Most Notably The Fact That The Victims Felt The
Sentences Were Too Harsh, It Denied Mr. Marks' Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).

"The criteria for examining

rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining
whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive
when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or
additional information presented with the motion for reduction." Id. (citation omitted).
When new information has been presented in support of a Rule 35 motion, the
appellate courts conduct "an independent review of the entire record available to the
trial court at sentencing, focusing on the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest." Id. (citing State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722 (2007)). When determining whether a sentence is excessive, the appellate courts
"consider the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard to
determine its reasonableness." Id. (citing Oliver).
At the hearing on his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Marks offered new information in
support of his motion.
been adjusted.

Specifically, since trial and sentencing, his medications have

The doctor who examined him at the prison and adjusted his

medications told him that he was "out of his head" as a result of the medications he was
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on prior to the adjustment.

Mr. Marks now takes heart medication for hypertension,

antidepressants for depression, and nerve stabilizers for physical pain. Mr. Marks also
testified that he has not been in trouble since being sent to prison. He further testified
that, since his sentencing, his daughters have told a case worker with the Department of
Health and Welfare that they were disappointed in the length of his sentence, believing
it should have been shorter. (Tr., p.1361, L.7 - p.1368, L.24.) On cross-examination,
Mr. Marks continued to maintain his innocence.

(Tr., p.1368, L.25 - p.1369, L.23.)

Defense counsel then requested that the district court "reduce the sentence [sic]
somewhere down into the 15-year period" and "retain jurisdiction in this case." (Tr.,
p.1372, Ls.20-22.)
In denying the motion, the district court acknowledged that people in Mr. Marks'
position - those who have maintained their innocence following a conviction

face "a

devil's choice" in deciding whether to admit to something they didn't do. The district
court then noted that it believed Mr. Marks was incapable of rehabilitating "until he
acknowledges his guilt." (Tr., p.1375, L.13 - p.1376, L.24.)
The people of Idaho thought that the rights of, and respect for, crime victims was
so important that they granted them specific rights via an amendment to the Idaho
Constitution. 10. CONST. art. I, § 22. Among those rights are the right "[t]o be treated with
fairness, respect, dignity, and privacy" and the right "[t]o be heard, upon request, at all
criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or
release of the defendant." Id. Both the spirit of the amendment and the specific rights
contained therein, require consideration of a victim's wishes even after sentence has
been imposed. The failure of the district court to give adequate consideration to the
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express wishes of the victims was an abuse of discretion and violated the Idaho
Constitution.
Mr. Marks asserts that, when the new information, most notably the wishes of the
victims in this matter, is considered alongside the mitigating factors presented at
sentencing, the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Marks respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial.

In the

alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his underlying sentences to
concurrent, unified sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed, or otherwise reduce
them as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2013.

PENCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

31

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of July, 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
FRANK DONALD MARKS
CIO SANDRA SMITH
355 IRVING RD
EUGENE OR 97404
BENJAMIN R SIMPSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
PO BOX 9000
COEUR D'ALENE 10 83816-9000
JEDEDIAH J WHITAKER
KOOTENAI CO PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETHKJORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE 10 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

SJH/khc

32

